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THE NFL FRANCHISE PLAYER RULE: LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
Restrictions on veteran free-agency in the National Football League
(NFL) have been the source of much litigation between players and
the NFL. However, the "Franchise Player" rule has met with few ob-
jections. While many would argue that the "Franchise Player" rule is
contrary to the concept of a free market system, I would suggest that
the franchise player rule, though restrictive in nature, is economically
efficient because it eliminates the high transaction costs associated
with negotiation. This paper discusses how the rule can be justified
under both the "Rule of Reason" and the Coase theorem.
II. THE HISTORY OF VETERAN FREE AGENCY RESTRICTIONS.
A. The Reserve System
The reserve system, determined to be an illegal restraint of trade in
Mackey v. National Football League (NFL), was one of the oldest re-
strictions on veteran free agency.' Under the reserve system, every
player who signs a contract with an NFL club was bound to play for
that club, and no other, for the term of the contract plus one addi-
tional year at the option of the club.2 The players' services were re-
served perpetually to one team upon that player's entry into the
league.3 Players had virtually no leverage in contract negotiations be-
cause the reserve system created a monopsony which prevented free
bidding by other buyers for the player's services. However, after play-
ers played out their contracts and the option clause, if the option was
not exercised by their current team, they were able to negotiate freely
with other teams to secure a new contract.4
The NFL's constitution and bylaws were amended in 1963 to adopt
a provision now known as the "Rozelle Rule" which "acknowledged
that when a player completed his contractual obligation to a club, usu-
ally by playing out the extra 'option' year for a 10% pay decrease after
his contract expired, he became a free agent and could negotiate with
1. See Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606,610 (8th Cir. 1976).
2. Id.
3. Jeffery D. Schneider, Unsportsmanlike Conduct: The Lack of Free Agency in the NFL, 64 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 797, 800 (March 1991).
4. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 610
1
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other NFL teams. 5 However, if the player signed with a new club, that
team owed compensation in the form of current players and/or draft
picks to the former team." 6
The "Rozelle Rule" expired with the 1970 collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) but the NFL Players Association (NFLPA) agreed
to a more restrictive rule in the 1977 CBA even after its hard-fought
victory in Mackey.7 Veteran free agents, defined as a player who has
signed at least one Players Contract with an NFL club, could become
free agents of sorts, although their club had the option to match any
offer made to a player and retain his services.8 If the team refused to
match the best offer made to the free agent, it was still entitled to
compensation by the signing club in the form of a future draft choice.9
B. Plan B
In the 1982 agreement, the parties agreed to essentially the same
system of free agency as the one contained in the 1977 agreement.' 0
However, Plan B, implemented by the NFL in February of 1989, did
offer a new form of free agency to a few players on each team." Plan
B provided that a team had the right to protect thirty-seven players on
its roster at the conclusion of each NFL season and leave the remain-
der of its roster as free agents.12 While it appeared that plan B may
have been the free agency proposal that players had been waiting for,
there were two problems. First, the list of unprotected players con-
tained only unwanted or less wanted players.'3 Second, plan B re-
moved benefits such as severance pay and pensions that had accrued
prior to the introduction of the plan from players who changed teams,
which provided a disincentive for players to exercise their rights as
free agents.14 The NFL owners argued that the inflation in salaries for
newly created free agents had to be offset by a reduction in benefits.' 5
5. Id.
6. Paul C. Weiler & Gary R. Roberts, Sports and the Law: Text, Cases, Problems 207 (Thom-
son West, 2004) (1993).
7. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 621 (holding that the "Rozelle Rule" was significantly more restrictive
than necessary to serve any legitimate purpose).
8. Schneider, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 814
9. Id.
10. Id. at 815.
11. Id. at 816.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 818.
14. Id.
15. Id. (citing Wilbon, Upshaw: NFL Proposal "Laughable," Wash. Post. Nov. 18, 1988, at D3,
col. 1).
[Vol. 5:1
NFL FRANCHISE PLAYER RULE
Protected players had the ability to move to other NFL teams only
if their current team chose not to match any new offers received, and
the new team paid compensation to the player's current team in the
form of draft picks whose number and round varied with the size of
the new salary offer.16 Many veteran players were able to take advan-
tage of the provisions of plan B and moved to other teams for sizeable
signing bonuses and salary increases although none were star play-
ers.17 In the summer of 1992, a Minneapolis jury, in McNeil v. NFL,
found that plan B violated the rule of reason, which requires that a
restraint be justified by legitimate business purposes and is no more
restrictive than necessary.18 In McNeil, eight football, players brought
suit against the NFL for violating section 1 of the Sherman Act. 9 Sec-
tion one provides that every contract in restraint of trade is illegal.20
Specifically, the plaintiffs were challenging the NFL's Plan B restric-
tions on each team's protected thirty-seven players. 21 Only four of the
eight plaintiffs were found to have suffered damages. 22 Subsequently,
a class action suit was filed in Minneapolis with Reggie White of the
Philadelphia Eagles as the named plaintiff.2 3 The class was seeking to
have the plan B system declared illegal as to all players not otherwise
involved in litigation.24 A settlement was reached between the NFL
and the NFLPA in January 1993 for $195 million to satisfy the claims
of the players who had been restricted by plan B and several other
NFL policies that had generated lawsuits. 25
Veteran players are now unrestricted free agents, at any time after
five full years of service, when their contracts expire. 26 Players and
teams are free to negotiate without penalty or restriction, including,
but not limited to, draft choice compensation between clubs or first
refusal rights of any kind.27 The unrestricted free agent is not subject
16. See supra note 6 at 211.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 212.
19. McNeil v. National Football League, 790 F. Supp. 871, (D. Minn. 1992).
20. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. (West 2004).
21. McNeil, 790 F. Supp. at 873
22. See supra note 6 at 212.
23. White v. National Football League, 836 F. Supp. 1458, 1461 n.4 (D. Minn. 1993). In White, 5
NFL Players, represented by class counsel, challenged the legality of the NFL player reserve
system. The named plaintiffs were Reggie White, Michael Buck, Hardy Nickerson, Vann McEl-
roy, and Dave Duerson.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. 2006 Collective Bargaining Agreement between NFLMA and NFLPA, available at http://
www.nflplayers.com/images/fck/NFL%20COLLECTIVE%20BARGAINING %20AGREE-
MENT%202006%20-%202012.pdf. (Last visited on November 8, 2008).
27. Id. at 35.
2008] 3
4 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
to any limitations on the period of time before he may qualify as an
unrestricted free agent again or to any limitations on the number of
times he may be an unrestricted free agent.28 Any veteran free agent
with three or more accrued seasons, but less than five accrued seasons
at the end of his last player contract becomes a restricted free agent
subject to right of first refusal and draft choice compensation to the
signing team. 2 9
III. THE FRANCHISE PLAYER RULE
Each season, every NFL team may designate a player who would
otherwise qualify as a restricted or unrestricted free agent as a
"Franchise Player."30 During that season, the club has the exclusive
right to negotiate with and sign the player to a contract.31 The team
must designate the "Franchise Player" between the 22nd day preced-
ing the first day of the new league year and 4 p.m. New York time on
the eighth day preceding the first day of the new league year.32
The designating team has the option of offering the "Franchise
Player" one of two required tenders.33 The first option is a one year
NFL Player Contract for the average of the five largest prior year sal-
aries for players at the position at which the player played the most
games during the prior league year or 120% of his prior year salary,
whichever is greater.34 The second option is a one year NFL Player
Contract for (1) the average of the five largest salaries for the league
year as of the end of the restricted free agent signing period that
league year for players at the position at which he played the most
games during the prior league year or (2) the amount required under
the first option, whichever is greater.35
If a team designates a player as a "Franchise Player" three times, on
the third time, the team shall be deemed to have tendered the player a
one year NFL Player Contract for the greater of (1) the average of the
five largest prior year salaries for players with the highest such aver-
age; (2) 120% of the average of the five largest prior year salaries for
players at the position at which the player played the most games dur-
ing the prior league year; or (3) 144% of his prior year salary.36 In
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 42.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 68.
36. Id. at 68-69.
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lieu of designating a player a "Franchise Player" for a third time, a
team may designate a player as a "Transition Player," which gives the
player the right to freely negotiate and sign with another team, subject
only to the first team's right of first refusal.37 If a team makes a
"Transition Player" designation, it will be deemed to have tendered
the player a one year NFL Player Contract for the average of the ten
largest prior year salaries for players at the position at which he
played the most games during the prior league year or 120% of his
prior year salary, whichever is greater.38
In White v. NFL, several members of the class raised objections to
the "Franchise Player" rule but their arguments were unavailing. 39
One of the arguments raised in opposition to the Rule was that Play-
ers would be deprived of any increase in the marketplace for the cur-
rent year, and would always be one year behind other players for
purposes of participating in market-wide salary increases. 40 The
Court responded by saying that "'Franchise Players' may use con-
tracts entered into by other players in the same position [in the cur-
rent year] as a benchmark for their own negotiations, thereby
benefiting from market increases in the current year. Thus, despite
their designation, 'Franchise Players' will still receive substantial ben-
efit from the increased competition for player services." 4 1
Article XX, Section 2(a)(ii), of the 2006 amended CBA addresses
the concern about unrealized market increases by providing for the
average of the five largest salaries for the league year as of the end of
the restricted free agent signing period that league year or the average
of the five largest prior year salaries for players at the position at
which the player played the most games during the prior league year
or 120% of his prior year salary, whichever is greater.42 In upholding
the validity of the "Franchise Player" rule, the White court held that
the Franchise Player rule conferred substantial benefits on the White
class and noted that "Wilber Marshall, an objector and the Washing-
ton Redskins' designated 'Franchise Player,' recently signed a one
year contract with the Houston Oilers for the 1993 season, under
which he is to receive a salary of $2.75 million, plus an agreement that
the Oilers will not designate him as a 'Franchise Player' for the 1994
season. The Washington Redskins have agreed to pay Mr. Marshall an
37. Id. at 69.
38. Id. at 71.
39. White v. National Football League, 836 F. Supp. 1458, 1481 (D. Minn. 1993).
40. White v. National Football League, 822 F. Supp. 1389, 1427 (D. Minn. 1993)
41. Id.
42. See supra note 35.
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additional $150,000. Mr. Marshall's ability to obtain a contract with a
new team at a salary more than $1 million greater than his required
tender as a 'Franchise Player' confirms the court's prior conclusion, in
its order of April 30, 1993, that the 'required tenders act merely as a
floor and not a ceiling on the designated player's salary.'" 4 3
A. Analysis of the Rule Under the Rule of Reason
Although there has been little litigation surrounding the "Franchise
Player" rule, the rule can be easily justified by applying the "Rule of
Reason" analysis. Under Rule of Reason balancing, the "key issue is
... whether the [Franchise Player rule] is essential to the maintenance
of competitive balance, and is no more restrictive than necessary to
achieve that balance." 44 The Mackey court held that the "Rozelle
Rule" was a restraint of trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act. While the "Rozelle Rule" was not found to be a per se violation
of the Sherman Act, it was found to be invalid under the Rule of Rea-
son because it was more restrictive than necessary to serve any legiti-
mate purposes it might have.45
1. The Franchise Player rule as essential to the maintenance of the
competitive balance of the NFL.
The Mackey court acknowledged that the NFL has a strong and
unique interest in maintaining competitive balance among its teams.46
The NFL advanced several justifications in support of its position that
the "Rozelle Rule" was essential to such balance. 4 7 Although the
Mackey court found the proffered justifications unavailing as they re-
lated to the "Rozelle Rule," many of those justifications, if not all, are
useful to demonstrate how the "Franchise Player" rule serves to main-
tain the competitive balance of the NFL.
One justification for the "Franchise Player" rule is that star players
would flock to cities having natural advantages such as larger eco-
nomic bases, winning teams, warmer climates, and greater media op-
portunities; that competitive balance throughout the League would
thus be destroyed; and that the destruction of competitive balance
would ultimately lead to diminished spectator interest, franchise fail-
ures, and perhaps the demise of the NFL, at least as it operates to-
43. White, 836 F.Supp. at 1481.
44. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 621.
45. Id. at 622.
46. Id. at 621.
47. See id. generally.
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day.4 8 The preference for warm weather, particularly after playing in
cold weather environments for a few years, can serve as motivation
for a free agent to leave their current team and move to a new team
with a warmer climate. 4 9 There has been scientific data that suggests
seasonal and weather changes may affect mood and happiness, thus
motivating individuals to pursue settings most compatible with
weather preferences.50 At least one NFL player has moved to a new
team for this specific reason.5 1
Due to independent management, all seeking to maximize their
own wealth, and the ongoing expansion of teams, there is heightened
direct competition for media exposure and fan support.5 2 Thus, it is in
a player's interest to sign with a team in one of the larger media mar-
kets in order to increase his own exposure and marketability. The
League has acknowledged the inequity between the teams and shares
revenues to prevent teams in major media markets from obtaining ec-
onomic advantages that would destroy competitive balance.53 Those
economic advantages include the ability to attract the best talent and,
as a result, sell a large number of tickets and attract a large television
viewership.
Cities with larger economic bases are more attractive than cities
with smaller economic bases for obvious reasons. First, the larger the
economic base, the larger the disposable income of the fan base and
the potential ticket sales. Second, in order to generate more revenue,
NFL owners frequently turn to the cities to finance new or renovated
stadiums.54 Without a large economic base, there may not be enough
tax revenue to finance new or renovated stadiums. Finally, cities with
large economic bases are more attractive because they are better able
to absorb the cost of stadium luxury suites and club seats, increasing
the team's non-shared revenue, which improves its revenue compared
48. Id. at 621.
49. Michael McCann, It's Not About the Money: The Role of Preferences, Cognitive Biases,
and Heuristics Among Professional Athletes, 71 BKNLR 1459, 1502 (2006).
50. Id. at 1503.
51. In 1990, Jack Smerlas, who had played the previous eleven seasons in New York with the
Buffalo Bills, was an unrestricted free agent and chose to sign with the San Francisco 49ers even
though their offer was the least lucrative of the three offers he received and even though it
lacked a guarantee. His representative said that Smerlas valued the warm weather of San Fran-
cisco in distinguishing between the offers. Id. at 1502-03.
52. See Robert D. Koch, 4th and Goal: Maurice Clarett Tackles the NFL Eligibility Rule, 24
Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 291, 312 (2004).
53. Professional Sports Industry, Anticompetitive Practices Prohibition: Hearing Before the
House Select Comm. on Professional Sports, 94th Cong. 78-79 (1977)(testimony of Pete
Rozelle).
54. Travis T. Tygart, Antitrust's Impact on the National Football League and Team Relocation,
7 SPLAWJ 29, 34 (2000).
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to other teams and puts the team in a better position to attract the top
free agents to its team.55 Additionally, the desire to win conference
and league championships may cause players to sign with winning
teams.
If players could leave their current team in favor of a new team that
possesses a larger economic base, a winning team, a warmer climate,
and greater media opportunities, competitive balance throughout the
League would be destroyed because teams in less desirable markets
would not be able to attract and retain the most talented free agents.
As a result, the best players would end up on teams with the most
desirable circumstances and the other teams would be limited to play-
ers that are not as talented. The destruction of competitive balance
would ultimately lead to diminished spectator interest and franchise
failures. The "Franchise Player" rule serves to eliminate the risk of
the destruction of the competitive balance because it allows a team to
retain the player it deems most important to the team's ability to re-
main competitive.
Another justification that has been advanced in favor of free agent
mobility restrictions is the necessity to protect the clubs' investment in
scouting expenses and player developments costs. 5 6 This justification
can also be applied to the "Franchise Player" rule. Teams dedicate a
large portion of their resources to scouting and developing the players
they successfully recruit. The "Franchise Player" rule allows teams to
receive some return on their investment, especially when the team has
invested more than usual in scouting and developing a player based on
the team's belief that the player will increase the team's ability to suc-
cessfully compete in the league. The rule also encourages teams to
make such investments because without rule, teams would fear that
the player would leave when his contract expired and the new team
would receive the benefits of the prior team's investment. In Mackey,
the district court rejected this argument stating that these expenses
are similar to those incurred by other businesses, and that there is no
right to compensation for this type of investment. However, while it
may not have been the case when Mackey was decided, it is now a
common practice for businesses to require employees to sign a con-
tract saying they will work for a specified minimum amount of time,
especially when the business has paid for an employee's college edu-
cation or has provided some other form training.57
55. Id. at 32.
56. See supra note 41.
57. This includes graduate degrees and training necessary for the performance of the em-
ployee's position.
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It has also been argued that players must work together for a sub-
stantial period of time in order to function effectively as a team; that
elimination of the [mobility restriction] would lead to increased player
movement and a concomitant reduction in player continuity; and that
the quality of play in the NFL would thus suffer, leading to reduced
spectator interest, and financial detriment to both the clubs and the
players.58 The "Franchise Player" rule serves to facilitate team cohe-
sion by ensuring that at least one of the team's valuable players will
remain on the team. Since this player is the player most likely to leave
the team due to his increased marketability, player continuity is in-
creased simply by restricting his mobility. The reserve clause also pro-
moted player continuity, but its terms were much more oppressive
given that there was a pay decrease and it affected more players.
While it is true that the "Franchise Player" rule has no effect on other
unrestricted free agents, it is arguable that retention of a player capa-
ble of helping the team maintain its competitiveness makes the team
more attractive to other players that might otherwise choose to sign
with another team when their contracts expired. This would actually
preserve the quality of play in the NFL and cultivate spectator interest
and financial success for the clubs and the players.
2. Is the Franchise Player Rule More Restrictive than Necessary to
Maintain Competitive Balance?
The foregoing discussion illustrates how the "Franchise Player" rule
serves to maintain competitive balance in the NFL and is therefore
reasonable. However, restrictions on player mobility can only be up-
held if they are no more restrictive than necessary to achieve the
stated objective.59 The Mackey court cited several reasons why it be-
lieved that the "Rozelle Rule" was significantly more restrictive than
necessary to serve any legitimate purposes it might have. First, the
Court stated that "little concern was manifested at trial over the free
movement of average or below average players." 60 It added, "[o]nly
the movement of the better players was urged as being detrimental to
football," and pointed out that the "Rozelle Rule" applied to every
NFL player regardless of his status or ability. 61 The "Franchise
Player" rule addresses the Court's concerns by focusing the impact of
the Rule on the better players. While the "Rozelle Rule" applied to
every player regardless of his status or ability, the "Franchise Player"
58. See supra note 41.
59. See supra note 1.
60. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 622.
61. Id.
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rule is applied to retain the services of one player on a team, most
likely the best player, in order to maintain the team's competitiveness.
This process allows a team to focus its efforts on ensuring that the
team is able to continue to be competitive, and ultimately profitable,
without unnecessarily restricting the mobility of players who are not
specifically tied to that goal.
Next, the Court pointed out that the "Rozelle Rule" was unlimited
in duration and that it operated as a perpetual restriction on a player's
ability to sell his services in an open market throughout his career.
The "Franchise Player" Rule is different in that it is not unlimited in
duration. A "Franchise Player" is signed to a one year contract only
and every time he is designated as such his salary increases signifi-
cantly.6 2 Furthermore, after the third designation, the player is ten-
dered a one year contract for the greater of (1) the average of the five
largest prior year salaries for players with the highest such average;
(2) 120% of the average of the five largest prior year salaries for play-
ers at the position at which the player played the most games during
the prior league year; or (3) 144% of his prior year salary.63 This grad-
uated pay scale serves to discourage teams from making the designa-
tion unlimited in duration because eventually the salary increases will
outpace the benefits gained from the "Franchise Player" designation.
Finally, the Court said that the enforcement of the "Rozelle Rule"
was unaccompanied by procedural safeguards and, as a result, a player
had no input into the process by which fair compensation was deter-
mined. The Court added that the player may be unaware of the pre-
cise compensation demanded by his former team, and that other
teams might be interested in him but for the degree of compensation
sought. The "Franchise Player" rule does not create such oppression
because the player's compensation is determined by the market as de-
scribed above and because the designated player is not permitted to
negotiate with any team other than his current team.64
IV. THE COASE THEOREM AS AN ALTERNATIVE JUSTIFICATION
FOR THE FRANCHISE PLAYER RULE.
Although the "Franchise Player" rule can easily be justified under
the rule of reason analysis discussed above, it can also be justified in
terms of its economic efficiency. One theory that can be used to ana-
lyze the efficiency of the rule is the Coase theorem. The Coase theo-
62. See supra note 35.
63. Id. at 68-69.
64. Id.
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rem is the fundamental proposition of the law and economics
movement. The theorem posits that in the absence of transaction costs
and wealth or economic effects 65, when there are rules that place lia-
bility on one party for an act infringing upon the rights of others, the
parties to a transaction will reach an efficient negotiated result that
will always be the same regardless of whether the rule places liability
on Party A or Party B. 6 6
One example of how the theorem works in practice involves a situa-
tion where Party A and Party B engage in incompatible land uses.67
In the example, A is given the right to pollute B's stream. This is
worth fifty dollars to A, but B would pay A sixty dollars not to pol-
lute.6 8 In the absence of transaction costs, both parties would agree
not to pollute because the sixty dollar payment A could receive from
B represents a cost to A. 6 9 As a result, A would bargain for a payment
higher than fifty dollars, the value of the right to pollute B's stream. 70
Likewise, A could offer B fifty dollars not to exercise his right if B was
given the right to prevent the pollution.7' In either case, an efficient
result is reached because there would be no pollution. 72 This version
of the Coase theorem is known as the invariant version of the theory
and is the one always espoused by Coase.73 The other version of the
theorem is the efficiency version, which states that in the absence of
transaction costs, when a liability rule changes, the allocation of re-
sources may change although it remains efficient. 74 This is a weaker
version of the theory, however, in that it is circular. 75 Put differently,
it states that when there are no transaction costs, you get the results
you get when there are no transaction costs. 7 6
A. Background on the Coase Theorem and Law and Economics
The Coase theorem, introduced by Ronald Coase in his article, The
Problem of Social Cost (1960), is an outgrowth of the law and eco-
65. Daniel Q. Posin, The Error of the Coase Theorem: Of Judges Hand and Posner and Carroll
Towing, 74 Tul. L. Rev. 629, 633 (1999).
66. Schneider, 64 S. Cal. Rev. at 843
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See supra note 62 at 634.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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nomics movement." The law and economics movement began in Chi-
cago in the 1940's under the guidance of Henry Simons and Aaron
Director, who were both economists appointed the University of Chi-
cago Law School.78 Law and economics has been described as "the
application of economic theory and econometric methods to examine
the formation, structure, processes, and impact of law and legal insti-
tutions."79 While there are several divisions of law and economics, the
Chicago School is the most well known and the most influential.80 In
fact, the term "law and economics" usually refers to the Chicago
School.8' One of law and economics' most notable proponents is
Richard Posner, a judge in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
Judge Posner's 1973 publication of Economic Analysis of Law had a
tremendous impact on legal education and scholarship. 82 His central
premise was that "judicial opinions do or should display an economic
logic."8 3
B. Assumptions of the theory
The Coase theorem assumes that (1) there are two agents in every
transaction; (2) each agent has perfect knowledge about the other's
utility functions; (3) a competitive market exists; (4) there are no
transaction costs; (5) there is a costless and impartial dispute resolu-
tion system; (6) producers are profit maximizing and consumers are
utility maximizers; and (7) there are no wealth effects.8 4 As long as
these assumptions are met, efficiency is unaffected regardless of which
party is held liable. 5
All of the above factors are present in player contract negotiations,
with one exception: low transaction costs. First, the negotiations occur
between two agents, the player and the team. Second, both of the
parties possess nearly perfect knowledge about the other's utility func-
tion. Knowledge about other teams and others players is widely avail-
able in the NFL.8 6 The rosters, payroll expenditures, injury reports,
77. See Jeremiah C. Humes, Macroeconomic Analysis of the Law: The Missing Piece of the
Law and Economics Puzzle, 42 Washburn L.J. 957, 966 (2004).
78. Macroeconomic Analysis of the Law: The Missing Piece of the Law and Economics Puzzle
at 964.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Daniel T. Ostas, Postmodern Economic Analysis of Law: Extending the Pragmatic Visions
of Richard A. Posner, 36 Am. Bus. L.J. 193, 193-94 (1998).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 844.
85. Id. at 843.
86. Id. at 844.
[Vol. 5:1
NFL FRANCHISE PLAYER RULE
and playing statistics of every NFL team is available to every owner.87
Similarly, the CBA allows for the sharing of salary information be-
tween the teams and the players in the context of negotiations be-
tween the two so that players and teams are on even ground when
negotiating player contracts.88 Knowledge of the salaries of players
who play the same position and have the same level of skill allows
players to bargain for the fair market value of their skills. Third, a
competitive market exists within the NFL for the player's services.
Teams compete with each other for playing talent on a regular basis.89
Few or no situations have transaction costs that are minimal or non-
existent.90 However, the transaction costs associated with player con-
tract negotiations are particularly high. High transaction costs serve
as a barrier to efficient negotiations and reduce the overall amount of
exchange. 91 It is important to reduce transaction costs because a
player can only benefit from negotiations if the costs of bargaining do
not exceed the benefits.92 The NFL has many players and, as stated
above, information about those players and their salaries is very acces-
sible.93 Additionally, the terms of the collective bargaining agreement
provide a predetermined framework within which to negotiate and the
NFL's in-house counsel takes care of most of the work during a trans-
action. 94 However, the disparity in bargaining power, the possibility
of strategic behavior, and threat bargaining 95 create high transaction
costs and interfere with the parties' ability to achieve their desired
results. 96
Fifth, disputes between player and teams are usually resolved by the
Commissioner's office or through arbitration hearings,97 which sub-
stantially reduces the time it takes to resolve disputes and minimizes
the number of disputes that have to be resolved through litigation.
Sixth, the players and the teams are both profit and utility maximizers.
87. Id.
88. Robert H. Lattinville & Robert A. Boland, Coaching in the NFL: A Market Survey and
Legal Review, 17 Marq. Sports L.Rev. 109, 112 (2006).
89. Supra note 3 at 844.
90. Supra note 69.
91. Stephen M. Mcjohn, Default Rules in Contract Law as Response to Status Competition in
Negotiation, 31 Suffolk U. L. Rev 39, - (1997).
92. See id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. This is a concept from Game theory which posits that given the opportunity to bargain, the
parties might reach an inefficient result due to the threatened party and the threatener both
maintaining resolve.
96. Id; See generally Wayne Eastman, Everything's Up For Grabs: The Coasean Story in Game
Theoretic Terms, 31 New Eng. L. Rev. 1 (1996).
97. Id.
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The goal of the players is to receive the fair market value of their skills
and job security. The goal of the teams is to form the most talented
team possible in order to get as many wins as possible. This results in
more profits in the form of higher ticket and concession sales, more
licensing fees, and more premium seating sales.
Finally, there are few wealth effects in player contract negotiations.
While it is true that players who demonstrate greater ability receive
higher pay, players who play the same position and have the same
level of talent will generally be comparably paid. 98 Unrestricted free
agents have the comfort of knowing that they can command what the
market will pay for their services, with some exceptions.99 Likewise,
given the team's revenue sharing scheme, teams can rest assured that,
in most cases, no other team will make the player an offer so high that
it cannot match it.100 Additionally the salary cap prevents teams who
are spendthrifts from spending an exorbitant amount of money to se-
cure the best players.10' With the advent of unrestricted free agency
came the potential for teams with greater revenue potential to consist-
ently out-bid less affluent teams for the best players.102 The salary cap
allows the league to protect the competitive balance among the
teams.103 Although six out of the seven assumptions are met, the fact
that there are high transaction costs means that player contract nego-
tiations do not result in efficient results.
Despite the role of the NFLPA, the players in the NFL have a very
weak bargaining position compared to that of the team owners.104
Part of the reason for this inequity is players' dispensability and short
career span in the NFL. 05 Career-ending injuries and injuries that
reduce a player's skill are very common.106 As a result, teams contin-
uously attempt to upgrade the quality of their rosters, causing a con-
98. See supra note 23 at 42.
99. If a team is at or near the salary cap, the player may have to accept a lower salary in order
to join that team.
100. If one team is at or near the salary cap and the other team is not close to reaching the
salary cap, the latter may be able to offer the player more money irrespective of the fact that the
teams have roughly the same amount of revenue as a result of the revenue sharing system.
Under certain circumstances a team may go over the salary cap.
101. See Scott McPhee, First Down, Goal To Go: Enforcing the NFL's Salary Cap Using the
Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 17 Loy. L.A. Ent. L.J. 449, 457 (1997).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Derek D. Yu, The Reconciliation of Antitrust Laws and Labour Laws in Professional
Sports, 6 Sports Law. J. 159, 166 (1999).
105. Id. at 167.
106. Ethan Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 1989 Duke L.J.
339, 355 (1989).
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tinuous turnover of players.10 7 Perhaps the most important factor that
creates a disparity in bargaining power is the fact that a player's ath-
letic skills will be of little use in earning income in another industry.108
Unfortunately, this is the case both during and after their NFL ca-
reers, given the highly specialized nature of their skills and the fact
that the NFL is the only buyer of, and indeed the only market for the
players' services. 109 Consequently, players have neither the bargain-
ing power nor the leverage necessary to bargain to their desired result
because the teams know that the parties will eventually come to an
agreement due to the players' inability to take their skills elsewhere.
The Coase theorem has traditionally been applied in situations
where there were low transaction costs. However law and economics
scholars have applied the Coase theorem in real world circumstances
where transaction costs are high and the parties cannot bargain to an
efficient result.110 They do this by asserting that "in the case of high
transaction costs, the decision maker should ascertain the result the
parties would arrive at if transaction costs are low."' The decision
maker should [then] give the parties that result," which achieves an
efficient result without having to make any value choices.112 One ex-
ample of this is the rule in torts that states "the liability for avoiding a
harm should be given to the party who can avoid the harm at the least
cost." 1 3 Arguably, this is the rule they would arrive at themselves if
they could bargain."14
When there is a disparity in bargaining power, transaction costs are
increased and the Coase theorem appears to lose some of its utility.
However, as demonstrated by the tort rule above, the theorem can be
used to explain how rules produce efficient results in situations where
transaction costs are high. The "Franchise Player" rule is one such
rule and it is efficient because it provides the designated players and
the teams what they would have bargained for if the transaction costs
had been low. The "Franchise Player" rule also allows the parties to
avoid the pitfalls of strategic behavior and status competition that
often arises during the course of negotiations. The "Franchise Player"
rule allows teams to designate one payer who would otherwise qualify
as a free agent as a "Franchise Player" and the team has the exclusive
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Supra note 62 at 635.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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right to negotiate with and sign him to a contract." 5 This rule serves
the needs of both the designated player and the designating team in
that it allows them to avoid the high transaction costs and the ineffi-
cient results associated with bargaining. The rule is particularly bene-
ficial to the designated players because, as already discussed, players
have little bargaining power due to their lack of job security and the
non-transferability of their skills.'' 6
The "Franchise Player" rule is efficient because it gives the parties
what they would have bargained for if the transaction costs were low.
Obviously, if transaction costs are low, the team would attempt to ne-
gotiate to keep its best player. The "Franchise Player" rule allows
them to achieve that goal without drudging through the process of
negotiation. If the old team was forced to compete with other teams
on the free market in order to reenlist the player's services, it is possi-
ble that the old team would have to pay considerably more to sign him
to a new contract. While this creates an efficient result for the player,
the result is inefficient for the team. The rule guarantee's that the old
team will sign the player and limits the amount it will have to pay for
his continued services. The players also receive substantial benefits
from avoiding negotiation. Not only does the player not have to nego-
tiate with his current team to keep his job, he is also spared from the
tedious process of negotiating with other teams once his contract ex-
pires. The Franchise Player rule also guarantees the player a pay in-
crease equal to the average of the five highest salaries in the league
the current year, or the salary of the five highest players in the posi-
tion which the "Franchise Player" played the most games during the
previous season, or 120% of the "Franchise Player's" prior year sal-
ary, whichever is greater.
The "Franchise Player" rule allows the designated player and his
team to avoid the effects of strategic behavior.11 7 Game theorists sug-
gest that transaction costs are not the only barriers to achieving effi-
cient results.' 's They state that, even when transaction costs are low,
bargaining may result in inefficient results because parties' conflicting
interests may induce strategic behavior in the form of withholding ma-
terial information. 119 This creates asymmetric information and disad-
vantages the other party who assumes that they are bargaining at arms
length. In the context of the NFL, strategic behavior could result in
115. Supra note 23 at 42.
116. McPhee, supra note 101 at 457.
117. Supra note 88.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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players not disclosing such things as latent injuries hat could affect
their ability to play. Similarly, strategic behavior might prevent teams
from disclosing to a player that another team is interested in him that
has more room under their salary cap and could pay him more money.
Both situations cause inefficient results because the team may end up
signing the player and agreeing to pay him more than he is actually
worth1 20 and the player may end up signing with a team that can only
offer him a fraction of the salary that another could offer him due to
the salary cap.121
The "Franchise Player" rule is also efficient because it allows the
parties to avoid the costs associated with status competition. These
costs arise from the desire to be the winner of a negotiation.122 How-
ever, contrary to what one might think, the desire to be the winner can
have detrimental effects on negotiations by shifting the parties' goal
from achieving efficient results to winning a negation point.123 Parties
sometimes get sidetracked, often by their emotions, and go awry of
seeking their original goals.124 They become preoccupied with saving
face and nothing is more important than prevailing over the other
side.125 In fact, parties sometimes become unable to agree to a trans-
action that gives them what they were originally bargaining for be-
cause to agree to such transaction would cause them to lose some
degree of status.126 This is more likely to be the case with players
given the fact that they start out in a weaker bargaining position and
have nothing except their status as an excellent player to use as cur-
rency in the negotiations. The "Franchise Player" rule allows both the
designated player and his team to save face and maintain their status
by eliminating opportunities for conflict and by allowing both parties
to be the winner.
Another disadvantage to status competition is that one or both of
the parties may not feel free to bargain for something that they really
want because they believe that asking for it would create a loss in
120. The team has the right to terminate a player if he is injured. However, if certain criteria
are met, he is entitled to 50% of his salary for the League year following the injury, up to a
maximum payment of $275,000, unless the has negotiated more injury protection or a larger
guaranteed salary into his contract. This provision is good for the 2006-08 League years.
121. The salary cap for the 2007 League year is $109 million. It will be 57.5% of Projected
Total Revenues, less League-wide projected benefits, divided by the number of players playing
in NFL during that year.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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status.127 For example, a woman may be reluctant to attempt to nego-
tiate into her employment contract a provision that would allow her to
telecommute one day a week so that she could spend more time with
her small children. Her reluctance is the result of the stigma associ-
ated with working mothers and she feels that requesting such provi-
sion would suggest that her family responsibilities would conflict with
her ability to successfully perform her job responsibilities. Similarly,
an NFL player might want to negotiate into his contract a provision
stating that he needs a private dressing room on game days because he
tends to get sick to his stomach when he gets nervous. He may feel
that this is something he cannot ask for because nervousness is a sign
of weakness in a football player and he does not want to be perceived
as being weak. The "Franchise Player" rule makes it unnecessary to
negotiate because the terms of the agreement are prescribed and the
awkwardness associated with requesting something you think will
cause you to suffer a loss of status is eliminated.
V. CONCLUSION
The "Franchise Player" rule provides substantial benefits to both
the designated player and his team. Both the "Rule of Reason" and
the Coase theorem serve as strong justification for the rule. Not only
is the Coase theorem useful when there are low transaction costs, but
it is also useful in providing what parties would have bargained for in
cases where the transaction costs are prohibitive. Because the
Franchise Player rule allows the parties to avoid threat bargaining,
status competition, and strategic behavior, it produces more efficient
results than bargaining over the terms of the players contract.
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